If “truth-values are not universal, let alone ‘known to be true’ in any objective sense,” how can we say there exists any objective truth, objective morality included? As you said, “the science of sense may disregard the concept of truth for the sake of consistency and practical relevance.”
The question of ‘truth’ does not make sense until we can define/explain what we mean by this term in a way that makes sense (is consistent, not circular, not question-begging) and how it is could be a condition of objectivity. As such, sense is prior to truth, and since sense is the condition of all identity it is ‘objective’ (an intrinsic property of all meaning and being) irrespective of any additional criteria. Objective morality is then a subset of sense, not of ‘truth’, which is yet to be consistently defined as something distinct from sense.
Ok. This is definitely distinct from the traditional understanding of objective morality as eternal, mind-independent moral facts. As I understand you, objective morality is not a set of truths waiting to be discovered; it is the emergent necessity of consistency, relevance, and coherence in the unfolding of meaningful life.
Not emergent, but implicit to consciousness as the domain of sense, and its violations diminish the sense of conscious agency. As such, they can be discovered, but whether this makes them ‘true’ or ‘facts’ depends on how truth is defined. If we differentiate logical ‘facts’ (that which follows from premises, as a matter of logical necessity) from what we mean by facts of life, then we can say that what makes a priori sense is a fact, a truth. But I argue that this additional qualification is spurious, at best a synonym for logical necessity.
Alright. This is helpful. So morality is not emergent, but structurally implicit in the nature of sense-making consciousness. It is not a set of truths in the traditional metaphysical sense, but consists of logically necessary constraints on coherence, which, when violated, diminish the integrity of conscious agency. These constraints can be recognized, but calling them ‘truths’ is either redundant or misleading.
However, I’m still of the view that morality, coherence, and even the integrity of consciousness all function interdependently and conventionally, but none of them possess intrinsic existence or ultimate necessity.
The term ‘existence’ is subject to similar objections as ‘truth’. Saying that consciousness ‘exists’ adds nothing to the sense of being conscious. I do not argue that consciousness is ultimately necessary but only that certain logical structure is presupposed by consciousness, intrinsic to it, and to break that structure implies not being fully conscious. It is possible to break the structure of consciousness, wholly or incrementally, on the individual level, and that is precisely what makes the moral law practically meaningful: it permits us to destroy ourselves, and it permits us to become more conscious, according to its structure.
If “truth-values are not universal, let alone ‘known to be true’ in any objective sense,” how can we say there exists any objective truth, objective morality included? As you said, “the science of sense may disregard the concept of truth for the sake of consistency and practical relevance.”
The question of ‘truth’ does not make sense until we can define/explain what we mean by this term in a way that makes sense (is consistent, not circular, not question-begging) and how it is could be a condition of objectivity. As such, sense is prior to truth, and since sense is the condition of all identity it is ‘objective’ (an intrinsic property of all meaning and being) irrespective of any additional criteria. Objective morality is then a subset of sense, not of ‘truth’, which is yet to be consistently defined as something distinct from sense.
Ok. This is definitely distinct from the traditional understanding of objective morality as eternal, mind-independent moral facts. As I understand you, objective morality is not a set of truths waiting to be discovered; it is the emergent necessity of consistency, relevance, and coherence in the unfolding of meaningful life.
Not emergent, but implicit to consciousness as the domain of sense, and its violations diminish the sense of conscious agency. As such, they can be discovered, but whether this makes them ‘true’ or ‘facts’ depends on how truth is defined. If we differentiate logical ‘facts’ (that which follows from premises, as a matter of logical necessity) from what we mean by facts of life, then we can say that what makes a priori sense is a fact, a truth. But I argue that this additional qualification is spurious, at best a synonym for logical necessity.
Alright. This is helpful. So morality is not emergent, but structurally implicit in the nature of sense-making consciousness. It is not a set of truths in the traditional metaphysical sense, but consists of logically necessary constraints on coherence, which, when violated, diminish the integrity of conscious agency. These constraints can be recognized, but calling them ‘truths’ is either redundant or misleading.
However, I’m still of the view that morality, coherence, and even the integrity of consciousness all function interdependently and conventionally, but none of them possess intrinsic existence or ultimate necessity.
The term ‘existence’ is subject to similar objections as ‘truth’. Saying that consciousness ‘exists’ adds nothing to the sense of being conscious. I do not argue that consciousness is ultimately necessary but only that certain logical structure is presupposed by consciousness, intrinsic to it, and to break that structure implies not being fully conscious. It is possible to break the structure of consciousness, wholly or incrementally, on the individual level, and that is precisely what makes the moral law practically meaningful: it permits us to destroy ourselves, and it permits us to become more conscious, according to its structure.