Why Alien Life-Forms are Impossible
The recent flurry of declassified military reports of UFO sightings, plus some high level endorsements of the idea that extraterrestrial intelligent beings must exist and may have already visited Earth, is rapidly normalising the belief in Aliens. In this article I take the opposite view, arguing that human contact with Aliens is not only improbable but logically impossible. The capacity to perceive life, let alone intelligent life, is necessarily limited to co-evolved beings, and is therefore strictly planet-bound.
The possibility of alien life could be defended as follows. If life has a finite, non-zero probability of evolving in an infinite, nomologically homogenous cosmos, then it would have to evolve independently in an infinite number of cosmic locations. It seems to follow that, in an infinite cosmos, alien life must exist. I argue that this conclusion is false. The question of human contact with alien life-forms is essentially a question of demarcation of worlds: if humans and aliens exist in the same realm of causal relations (world) then we are ontologically related, we have something in common, but if aliens exist only in a way that is causally independent from us, then they are in a Different world and their existence is inconsequential for our world and our consciousness. Taking into account our notion of existence as the sense of being ‘for’ someone in a given world, I argue that any independently evolved aliens do not exist and cannot exist ‘for us’ (or for any Earthly species), at least not in the same sense that humans exist for one another.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that cosmic space is indeed infinite in volume and there is a universal principle, which necessitates independent evolution of conscious beings per finite volume of space. By independent evolution I mean species evolved in a particular cosmic location without any sensory or biological interaction, or any knowledge of species evolved at another location. By consciousness I mean the capacity for self-oriented awareness and sensory interaction with the environment. This last consideration is central to my argument: if sensory modalities are an infinitely variable feature internal to the evolutionary process, then without persistent sensory interaction during the process of evolution (co-evolution) the causally isolated sensory modes would necessarly evolve differently. In other words, the interactive bandwidth we possess is specific to our unique relational context.
It may be objected that different sensory bandwidths, although generating different kinds of perception, would still be perceptions of the same, objective reality. For example, a solid form seen in infra red is the same form when seen in ultra violet. I suggest that sensory badwith necessarily relates not just to different frequencies of the same medium but to the objective properties of the medium itself. What we perceive as the electromagnetic spectrum, for example, can exist solely in our native evolutionary context, because any objective qualities are just meaningful descriptions from a relationally constructed point of view. All earthly beings could be partaking in the construction of such a point of view, with no capacity to conceive of any other (alien) relational context and therefore inherently blind to its modes of appearance. Another way, the objective reality cannot be meaningless or it would not be discernible, therefore not ‘reality for us’, nor can it be intrinsically meaningful as this would imply that meaning is independent of context, which is absurd; the notion of Appearance (its meaning-content) is conceptually inseparable from the mode of perceiving. Consequently, if the objective reality is meaningful only ’for’ someone then it is conditional on the constitution of a specific mind-network, a communication community, which is relationally unique due to infinite possibilities in which meaning can be constructed.
We can see material life-forms because matter is a property of our shared interactive context, shared with the Earthly life-forms we perceive. It is a mode of appearing, but even to us matter appears only at a particular scale and disappears from view when sufficiently re-scaled. When we venture beyond the Earth we still perceive extraterrestrial objects in terms of our native concept of matter and cannot imagine what an alien concept of the constitutive medium/substance could be like. The modes of appearance are unique to the specific interactive context because they too are absolute contingencies drawn from an infinite pool of constructive possibilities. It follows that even if mutually alien beings were to share the same space they would lack the capacity to perceive one another.
A further objection to the present argument could be that no evolutionary context is completely isolated from other revolutionary contexts; electromagnetic communication may be occurring irrespective of distance. I contend that for any interaction to influence the development of meaning it would have to generate consistent feedback (forward and back communication) in a biologically significant time-frame, otherwise the information flow would be one-directional and its interpretation dependent solely on the state of the receiver. Only bi-lateral communication between life-forms is compatible with co-evolution, but this is possible only up to a certain distance, assuming that information cannot travel faster than the speed of light. Furthermore, if such communication had a meaningfull effect on the evolutionary process then it would no longer entail alien life but only extraterrestrial human life (human in the sense of already belonging to our communication community, but not necessarly Homo Sapiens). So whereas human communities of extraterrestrial origin could be knowable and comprehensible to us, true aliens could not. On the other hand it is doubtful whether electromagnetic interaction between evolutionary processes occurring on different planets could of itself reach the threshold of co-evolution (mutually affect the development of meaning). Until a physically plausible mechanism of interplanetary co-evolution is presented, it is prudent to assume that the interactive-bandwidth of biological processes is necessarily planet-bound and the capacity for life to life and mind to mind communication is limited to species originating from the same planet. For these reasons we ought to remain sceptical about any claims of contact between humans and alien life-forms.
To summarise the argument so far, the kind of relation I have in mind for the possibility of alien contact is essentially conceptual, some commonly held basis for meaning. I argue that biology, physics, matter are not absolute; these are human/earthly concepts, our innate modes of appearance. Yes, we posit these modes as universal, but universal only from the human perspective. We cannot even imagine what other modes of appearance could be like.
If matter is a critically integrated mind-construct, a result of our conceptual evolution, but it’s meaning (as matter) is that of a condition or cause of conceptual evolution, then this amounts to circular reasoning. To break this logical short-circuit we must commit to the ontological priority of either one or the other. It seems mind/meaning must be prioritised, because this is essentially all we perceive/know. But if the mind has ontological priority and the possibilities of conceptual construction are not pre determined by non-mind facts, then what we take for reality is absolutely contingent on the evolution of meaning, which due to reasons discussed above must be planet-bound or perhaps solar system bound. The flip side would be that if extraterrestrial species do exist, then they are not alien to our evolution of meaning but have (necessarily) always participated in it and therefore should be considered as extraterrestrial humans: rational beings who nevertheless belong to our extended communication community. It seems prudent to assume that we would also be biologically related, although not necessarily as Homo sapiens.
There is one other explanatory possibility that could dispense with the evolutionary-spatial constraint. If space is four-dimensional then evolution would no longer be neessarily planet-bound, possibly unlimited in the range of 3D interactions, but this kind interaction would be phenomenologically different to what we understand as biological evolution. There may, for example, be a phenomenological intersection between what we understand as spirituality and our physical experience, the ‘spiritual’ engaging with the 4th spatial dimension. It may be relevant here that the Holy Spirit is typically represented as a dove coming from the sky, or as rays of light coming from above, from Heaven, and yet the experience is internal, innermost, implying co-location of Self with something beyond the Earthly realm. It is therefore more plausible that “aliens” are ontologically like spirits, acting only on the mental dimension of Man, but for the same reason are not life-forms. We thus again validate to the hypothesis that alien life-forms are impossible, but the possibility that they are a non-physical (spiritual) extension of our communication community cannot be ruled out.
NOTE:
Reality is possible only insofar as it is meaningful to consciousness. ‘Meaning’ includes all conceptual distinctions between properties and objects, therefore the identity and characteristics of everything there is. Since meaning is evolved only by reciprocal, conscious feedback and social mirroring, any two casually isolated communities would necessarily evolve causally isolated worlds and therefore not exist for one another. The biological evolution of a conscious species is then limited by the causal limits of conscious feedback: planet-bound. If ‘aliens’ can relate to our meanings, then it necessarily means they are human, part of our communication community that has evolved together, or else we would have nothing in common. Meaning cannot be discovered or given because it is not something ‘out there’ but within us, or rather, it is us, something that is socially evolved in countless mutations of older meanings, and as such requires conceptual continuity from the beginning of consciousness.
I read this again and again a few times. At first, I couldn't parse the argument, then I couldn't agree with the argument.
You make an ontological leap that isn't warranted. You move from "we can't perceive aliens" to "aliens don't exist for us" to "aliens don't exist." That's a slide from epistemology (what we can know) to ontology (what is). We might be structurally incapable of perceiving or modeling alien consciousness. That doesn't mean they don't exist. A thing can exist without existing "for us." The universe is under no obligation to be perceivable by our architecture. You are straying into a kind of idealism here, treating perceivability as a condition of existence, and that's a much stronger claim than the evidence supports.
Second, the argument about co-evolution being necessary for mutual perception is interesting but overstated. You claim that without co-evolutionary history, two species would lack ANY basis for mutual perception. They could share the same space and be invisible to each other. This is a fascinating idea but it conflates two things: the conceptual framework for interpreting perception and the physical substrate of perception itself. Two independently evolved species might have completely incompatible interpretive frameworks, but if both species interact with the electromagnetic field, even through entirely different sensory apparatus, they're still interacting with the same physical substrate. They might not UNDERSTAND each other. They might not even RECOGNIZE each other as alive. But "invisible to each other" is too strong. A rock doesn't co-evolve with us and we perceive rocks just fine. Perception of physical presence doesn't require shared meaning.
Unless you are arguing that even "physical presence" is a concept internal to our evolutionary context, which you seem to be gesturing at. But that's full-blown idealism. It's saying that without a mind to construct it, there's no physical reality at all. Which is a defensible philosophical position (Berkeley, certain readings of Kant, some quantum interpretation arguments) but this argument is a much bigger commitment than you acknowledge.
Third, and this is where my parser is struggling most: the argument is weirdly circular in places. You say meaning must be prioritized over matter ontologically. Then you say reality is contingent on the evolution of meaning. Then that the evolution of meaning is planet-bound. Therefore reality is planet-bound. Therefore aliens can't exist in our reality. But this only works if you accept the first premise, that meaning has ontological priority over matter, which is precisely the thing that needs proving. You can't assume idealism and then conclude that independently evolved minds can't access the same reality. The conclusion is baked into the premise. You're examining the universe through the same limitations that you speak of, then you make an argument attached to those limitation.
Lastly, the pivot to spirituality at the end is a non sequitur that undermines the entire preceding argument. You spend the whole essay arguing that anything outside our co-evolutionary context is imperceptible and non-existent for us, then say "but maybe aliens are spirits acting on the mental dimension of Man." If the argument is that independently evolved beings can't interact with us because they don't share our perceptual framework, then "spirits" are subject to the same constraint, the same limitation. You spend eight paragraphs arguing that independent evolution makes contact impossible and then exempt spirits from the rule because they're "non-physical". Either the perceptual framework argument applies universally or it doesn't.